


















Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung 
Center for European Integration Studies 


















How did Sweden Manage 




















Prof. Dr. Bo Bjurulf, born 1942, has been Associate Pro-
fessor at the Department of Political Science, University 
of Lund since 1972. After studies in mathematics, eco-
nomy and political science at Lund and doctoral studies at 
Lund and Rochester, New York, Bjurulf wrote a disserta-
tion, 1972, on “An Analysis of Some Aspects of the Voting 
Process”. This was followed by several articles and a 
book “A Dynamic Analysis of Scandinavian Roll-Call Be-
havior” (Lund 1974). Bjurulf then turned to Swedish elec-
toral behavior publishing several articles in edited books. 
After a ten year stint as a full time lecturer (1989-99) Bju-
rulf turned to Europe in general and the European 
Transparency process in particular. Bjurulf is now hea-
ding a project “Comparing Council Presidencies” founded 
by the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. In this 
project he has published a few articles in Swedish. 
 Bo Bjurulf
* 
How did Sweden Manage the 
European Union? 
From a Swedish perspective the Swedish Presidency during the spring of 
2001 was the single most important European event since the accession in 
1995. It has even been argued that for the first time since the Vienna con-
ference 1814-1815 Sweden could act on equal terms with the more power-
ful nations in determining European security policy (Wahlbäck, 2000, p 1). 
This raises several questions: 
(1) Does the presidency, as such, carry any weight? 
(2) Could a small member state, like Sweden, manage the EU as well as a 
large one like Germany or Great Britain? Is it possible that small is 
more efficient? 
(3) Did Sweden, in the role of the Presidency, influence the policies of the 
European Union? 
(4) To what extent can a reluctant and neutral nation like Sweden manage 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy area despite its non-NATO 
membership? What about the EMU? 
(5) What were the national and international reactions? 
 
*  In this article I have brought together research ideas from the book: When Europe 
came to Sweden: The Presidency of the EU 2001 (in Swedish) edited by Jonas Tall-
berg to be published by the end of 2001 by SNS, Stockholm, Sweden. The book is a 
product of the project Comparing Presidencies and affiliated. For further informa-
tion about the project visit our Web page: www.svet.lu.se/Research/Research.html. Bo Bjurulf 
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Does the presidency carry any weight? 
According  to the Treaty of Rome, the office of the Presidency is responsi-
ble for convening meetings and shall be held in turn by each member state 
for a term of six months.
1 These provisions express solely the management 
function of the Presidency. This very limited legal base for Council Presi-
dential action, combined with the initiative role of the Commission, r e-
sulted in the office of the Presidency being pictured as a paradox, encom-
passing "responsabilité sans pouvoir". Does this statement still hold true? 
The role of the Presidency has, it seems, developed as a response to new 
developments in the integration process, as well as changes in inter-
institutional relations. These are, in short: the development of the European 
Council as an institution, the increasing i nternational commitments (in par-
ticular, the quick evolution of or even revolution in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) and the enhanced role of the informal trialogues
2 and the 
conciliation committee in the co-decision procedure (cf. Hix, 1999, p. 94 
and Schackleton, 2001, .p. 6). 
Traditionally, leadership in the EU could be found in the Commission or in 
the German-French axis. The Commission was the EU-engine during the 
second half of the 1980's and the early 1990's. Weak Commission leader-
ship, legitimacy problems and an active promotion of intergovernmental 
cooperation has moved power from the Commission to the Council. Fur-
thermore a situation with new leaders in France and Germany, France 
pushing for parity while Germany is making concessions, has replaced the 
active cooperation between Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterand. The 
 
1  Presidencies 1998-2003: 1998 United Kingdom/Austria; 1999 Germany/Finland; 
2000 Portugal/France; 2001 Sweden/Belgium; 2002 Spain/Denmark; 2003 Greece. 
2  The ”informal trialogues” in the co-decision procedure have no direct support in the 
Treaties. Its flexibility has reduced the number of dossiers needed for meetings with 
the conciliation committee. The trialogue is an instrument used by the Presidency 
and the concepts trialogue, limited trialogue, developed trialogue, political trialogue 
and technical trialogue have been used. However, compared to parliamentary com-
mittees in the European Parliament the trialogues are closed even if there is a con-
siderable leakage especially by the MEPs who frequently put documents on the 
Internet or leak them to newspapers (cf. Note by the French Presidency 28 Novem-
ber 2000 and Shackleton, 2001). Sweden and the European Union 
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North/South cultural division is creating negotiation problems (cf. P. 14 
below). With successive enlargements the European Union will also face 
an East/West cultural division. 
All this implies that the European Union cries out for leadership, 
which opens a window of opportunity for increased influence by the 
Presidency (see Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Schout 1998 and 
Hix 1999). 
The Council Presidency is at the nexus between national and EU politics, 
and its role reflects these dual interests, emphasizing the intergovernmental 
game and national influences, but also the interplay with institutional a c-
tors, i.e. the Commission and the Parliament. In time certain role functions 
of t he Presidency have indeed increased in importance, in particular, its po-
sition as mediator, external representative and as spokesman and contact 
for the other EU institutions. 
Bobby McDonagh, a member of the Irish Presidency team, describes the 
feelings of the Irish when assuming the Presidency in 1996: 
(It was) like walking into a sudden pool of light. – Other delegations 
start turning to the incoming Presidency looking for answers. – Your 
thoughts, priorities and plans gradually begin to attract significant in-
terest (1998:69). 
This pool of light and the apparent increase in responsibilities raise the 
question of whether the Presidency also has become a more important 
power-base for member states, employed in order to further their national 
interests. The m ajor dilemma which each Presidency has to handle, and 
which often is noted in the literature, is the extent to which the Presidency 
can promote its own national interests or whether it should only concentrate 
on "getting things done" (e.g. Neligan 1998). 
The "getting things done" will be achieved through four functions: 
(1) Administration and coordination 
Sweden planned and carried through roughly 2000 meetings on all levels in 
the Council and arranged more than eighty informal meetings and confer-
ences spread out over about forty places in Sweden. The main administra-Bo Bjurulf 
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tive, coordinative and security challenges were the two European Council 
meetings in Stockholm and Gothenburg. Efficiency is the main goal of this 
function. 
The primary goal was to manage the issue inheritance as well as possible 
by producing joint strategies and decisions. In this management there was, 
however, a dilemma between influencing the Swedish opinion and i mprov-
ing the Swedish reputation in the European Union. The Swedish opinion 
would b e favourably influenced if Sweden were perceived as an i mportant 
actor in the EU, actively pushing "Swedish issues". Such an activity might, 
however, make the Swedish Presidency less efficient in "getting things 
done". To favour the Swedish opinion a lot o f information activities took 
place and in order to enhance the feeling of participation meetings were 
spread all over Sweden. Finally, the emphasis in the instructions for all r e-
lations on all levels was on "being open, helpful and service minded" (un-
published paper from the Swedish Government). 
(2) Political agenda setting 
Sweden's three priorities were Enlargement, Employment and Environment 
but some argue that Sweden's main result was the regulation 1049/2001 on 
public access to EU documents.  
The priorities of the Presidency are supposed to promote the interests of the 
entire union, so national concessions must be made to achieve results. 
However, when setting the agenda, the Presidency wields considerable 
power. The Presidency can push issues. During the first two months of the 
Swedish Presidency, it convened seven working group meetings, five 
COREPER meetings and four trialogues with parliament "all on the issue 
of access to documents" (Minister Brita Leijon, 15/3, 2000/01:22). The 
Presidency can also  exclude issues; actively keeping certain issues off the 
agenda during the six months a country holds the Presidency. The Northern 
and Southern dimensions have this character. The Portuguese Presidency 
was not actively promoting the Northern dimension, and their Southern di-
mension was not high on the Swedish agenda even though it has been dis-
cussed in the Swedish Parliament (January 2000). Challenging the notion Sweden and the European Union 
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that the Presidency offers a scope for active agenda management, some ob-
servers claim, however, that "the fact is that the great bulk of a Presidency's 
program will at all times consist of inherited and wholly foreseeable mate-
rial" (Neligan 1998:7, see also Wurzel 1996:280). Thus many Presidencies 
will only engage in agenda-clearing trying to avoid making any mistakes, 
being "consolidating" presidencies. The Finnish Presidency is a possible 
example. Moreover, unexpected urgent issues might crowd out prioritized 
ones. 
(3) Mediation 
The Presidency is supposed to carry issues forward to a decision through 
mediation and building consensus. Public access to EU documents, the fur-
ther liberalization of EU trade policies and the enlargement process were 
three important areas of mediation and consensus building for the Swedish 
Presidency. The repertoire of mediation instruments is large (see Westlake 
1995)  – ranging from "confessionals" in negotiations to high-level tours to 
foreign capitals, as the French presidency was doing before the Nice sum-
mit and as Sweden did before Gothenburg and in the access regulation pro-
cess. Sweden was, however, in Swedish and European press, criticized for 
this consensual leadership style, considered to be lacking in vision. I mpor-
tant deciding factors for a mediator is the ability to decide when the time is 
right and to have luck vis-à-vis the agenda. Sweden, I think, had the ability 
and the luck.  
(4) Representation 
Swedish ministers represented the Council in external meetings through the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and in internal co-decision negotia-
tions with parliament and commission. The extended use of the trialogue is 
of special interest here since it is argued that it moves power from the 
Commission to the Council (cf. Shackleton, 2001, p. 6).Within CFSP, 
Sweden showed in several issues, above all in the policy against Mace-
donia, a capacity and a will to produce a united EU strategy. Sweden as a 
small state did surprisingly well relying on good relations with Blair and 
Schröder. Relations between Solana, Patten and the Swedish Foreign Min-Bo Bjurulf 
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ister Lind seem to have been excellent. However, the visit to the Ukraine at 
the end of the Presidency was regarded in some quarters as excessive 
Swedish activity (Interview with a high-ranking Swedish Government offi-
cial, 21/8 2001). 
In conclusion states will vary in what type of leadership they try to adopt: 
consensual, consolidating, entrepreneurial or more power-oriented (cf. 
Malnes, 1995). Different strategies may be used in the pre-presidential, in 
the presidential and in the post-presidential phases.  
When the phones stop ringing, the Presidency knows that it is in the post-
presidential phase. 
That phase is, however, of great interest since this is the stage where the 
fate of the Presidency’s agenda setting is ultimately determined. At that 
stage Sweden must as a common Member State draw on the networks is 
has built up during its stint at the Presidency of the Council in order to get 
their proposals implemented (for this section cf. Tallberg, 2001). 
Can a small member state manage the 
European Union? 
Are the small member-states better or worse managers than the large ones? 
It is fairly often argued that the smaller states are the ones that do best. 
European Voice (1999, no 46) stated:  
The Finnish presidency has proved once again that small countries are 
often the most adept at managing the EU's business. 
The arguments behind this view are first of all degree of "commitment". 
For the smaller member states, whose capacity to contribute to the course 
of European integration may otherwise be restricted, the privileged role of 
the Presidency is of particular interest. The second argument is that small 
states are more efficient as mediators since they can never expect to be suc-
cessful in pushing their national interests the way large countries can. 
Small states must rely more on compromises and a problem solving capac-
ity. The third argument is that a small bureaucracy is not always or even Sweden and the European Union 
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usually a less efficient bureaucracy than a large one. A small staff with 
high quality has many advantages. The roads of communication are short 
and problems of coordination are facilitated. A fourth argument is that 
smaller countries usually have closer contacts with the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat. These closer contacts, it is argued, make for better 
presidencies. 
The counterarguments are primarily that managing capability is closely 
correlated with a member state's administrative and material strength, 
which often is associated with size. A larger state usually has a broader 
technical expertise. Primarily, however, a larger state is assumed to b e 
more able to put pressure on smaller states and push through solutions. It 
has been argued that: "success in EC negotiation and integration depends 
heavily on the political will of the larger member states" (Kirchner 1992, p. 
110). There has, however, been a detrimental tendency among the larger 
states to push national priorities. The British Presidency in 1992 and the 
French in 2000 are obvious examples. This can partly be explained by the 
fact that the larger states regard the Presidency as only a part  of their for-
eign policy while the Presidency is a unique opportunity for the smaller 
nations. As noted above the small nations have special problems with the 
external relations since this is of special interest for the larger nations and 
since the external large nations like USA, Russia and Japan tend to turn to 
the larger European states in important foreign policy issues. However, 
large nations obviously do act in the European interest. The best example 
might be Germany 1983, which was heavily praised after acting in a neutral 
manner in a conflict where the nation had very strong interests of its own. It 
is furthermore important to point out that the British management of its 
presidencies in 1992 and 1998 was roundly praised (for this section cf. 
Elgström/Carlsson, 2000, p. 82f. and Tallberg, 2001). 
I do think that Denmark, Finland and Sweden have proven that a small na-
tion can manage the practical aspects of being the President but the ques-
tion remains whether an ambitious small nation can influence the European 
Union through the Presidency. Managing the inheritance is one way. I m-
partiality, ability to listen, solving problems and being a builder of consen-Bo Bjurulf 
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sus are important functions for a successful manager. Those are not, how-
ever, functions for an influential Presidency – or are they? 
Did Sweden, in the role of the Presidency, influence the policies 
of the European Union? 
The Swedish Presidency  was focusing on enlargement, employment and 
environment. Providing access to European documents was an issue with a 
Commission proposal on the table and with positions taken by Parliament 
and the member states in the Council. Sweden pushed hard for enlargement 
and transparency with Germany opposing the presidential solutions in both 
issues. Employment and environment  were areas with large internal Swed-
ish expectations that Sweden would make a difference. CFSP was an unex-
pected addition more popular in Europe than at home. What kind of influ-
ence did the Swedish Presidency have on these issues? Did they meet the 
expectations? 
How could Sweden influence matters in a "history-making area" like the 
enlargement? It could be argued that the context for influence was not f a-
vourable since from the perspective of the Presidency Sweden was in a 
three-level game. The first level was the relation to Swedish opinion. Here, 
curiously enough, the sceptical Swedes were positive (see e.g. The Euro-
barometer, 54 April 2001) according to which 56% of the Swedes were in 
favour of the enlargement and 32% were against). The second  level were 
the meetings and discussions with the candidate countries. Without the 
huge efforts by the candidate countries facing an enthusiastic Presidency it 
would not have been possible to open sixty-four chapters
3 and close sixty-
six. After the Swedish period Hungary and Cyprus led the race with 22 
closed chapters followed by Slovenia with 20 closed chapters. Estonia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia were next with 19 closed chapters. Bulgaria 
and Rumania with ten and seven closed chapters need more time and a lot 
of  support. Poland, which especially by Germany, is considered to be the 
strategically most important country in the enlargement process, is after the 
 
3  The negotiations between the EU and the Candidate countries are subdivided into 
30 different topics called chapters. Sweden and the European Union 
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Swedish presidency only on a ninth position with sixteen closed chapters. 
On a positive note it has been argued that Poland is close to closure on a 
number of chapters (Commission representative interview 3/7, 2001). 
According to interviews with Commission officials (3/7, 2001) Sweden has 
found creative solutions in the environmental field, in the field of move-
ment of capital and the variable time frame for the free movement of l a-
bour. Moreover, there have been more chapters closed than were expected. 
The problematic third  level is the EU one. Internal EU discussions framed 
by a North/South division are complicated. Another problem was a Com-
mission wavering between a Swedish "regatta" position, that each applicant 
should be judged on its merits and a "political grouping" of the applicant 
countries. A political grouping would slow down the process according to 
Swedish representatives. Another problem were demands by Spain that 
they should be guaranteed the same level of regional support after the 
enlargement. Germany and France (e.g.) were against the dates in the Goth-
enburg document, which finally stated: 
At the meeting of the European Council in Gothenburg it was estab-
lished that a significant breakthrough had taken place and that the en-
largement procedure is now irreversible. Heads of government agreed 
on two deadlines: 
Conclusion of the negotiations before the end of 2002 for the best pre-
pared candidate countries; 
Accession to the EU for these countries in time to be able to partici-
pate in the European Parliament elections in 2004 as members (Re-
sults of the Swedish Presidency, 01/07/2001, p. 1). 
Against the dates, the German Chancellor Schröder argued that from a 
symbolic point of view this was more important for Sweden than for Ger-
many but that a goal is not a commitment (Economist, 23/6, 2001). A close 
look at what was agreed on tends to support Schröder's view that no prom-
ise was given. 
The negative result of the Irish referendum might have made dates more 
important and the flaring up of the conflict in Macedonia might have 
heightened the European security perspective. In fact a shift in "framing" 
might have been the most important result of the Swedish Presidency. The Bo Bjurulf 
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enlargement should not be about regional support, the invasion of labour or 
budgetary problems, it should be about security, welfare and democratisa-
tion. 
Obviously there were sour notes about the Gothenburg breakthrough. The 
Economist finds the parallel with the situation in the Soviet Union when 
the workers pretended to work and the politicians pretended to pay for it. 
The EU pretends that there is a breakthrough and the candidate countries 
pretend to believe it (Economist, 23/6, 2001, p. 40). 
Anyhow, it seems that a small country like Sweden can push an important 
issue like the enlargement with some success. Creativity and mediation 
ability paid off. It is also possible to conclude that the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat are the friends of the small countries. If power shifts 
away to the national governments that might be detrimental for the influ-
ence of small countries (for this section cf. Bengtsson, 2001). 
Sweden, which since 1995 had pushed for greater openness, found itself in 
quite a complicated situation when it should first, in the Council, chair the 
process to reach a common position on public access to EU-documents and 
then in a co-decision process with the Parliament argue this position. In the 
Council, Sweden's position was backed only by Finland, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands and to some extent by Great Britain and Ireland. The opposi-
tion to greater access was lead by France, Spain, Germany and Austria, a 
formidable opposition. However, the European Parliament's position was, 
especially when it came to parliamentary access, even more friendly t o-
wards openness than the Swedish view. So Sweden faced the unpleasant 
situation of having to argue for a common position far from its own prefer-
ences against a Parliament with some very radical views on openness. At 
the end of January 2001 trialogue negotiations between the Commission, 
the Parliament and the Council were in full swing and by the end of April 
an agreement was reached. In the Gothenburg document it was stated under 
the headline:  
An open, modern and effective union: A decision was taken on a regu-
lation that signifies a major step forward as regards openness in EU 
institutions and citizens´ access to EU documents. Both documents 
drawn up and documents received are covered by the regulation, in-Sweden and the European Union 
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cluding the sensitive documents (cf. the Solana decision), albeit with 
certain special rules. Public records must be established. These re-
cords will be available through the Internet. Swedish regulations on 
public access will not be affected negatively. The Council also 
adopted a decision to make Council documents available on the Inter-
net (Results of the Swedish Presidency, 01/07/2001, p .30f.). 
In this process we have two puzzles to unravel. 
(1) How can the different positions of Parliament and the Council be e x-
plained? Politicians from the same countries are found in both institu-
tions. 
(2) How did two minorities in Parliament and in the Council fundamentally 
change the Commission's proposal? 
One explanation to the first puzzle is the conflict between the diplomatic 
secrecy-culture in the Council versus the process-democratic position of the 
EU-parliament. The diplomatic secrecy culture is based on an intergovern-
mentalist perspective: 
We represent our country in complicated negotiations with other 
countries. Our negotiation positions must be secret in order to reach 
the best result possible for our countries. Furthermore, if we divulge 
the positions of the other countries this will effect the negotiation con-
fidence in a negative way. 
Against this we have the Parliament's position that this is a joint problem-
solving process and that Parliament must be as well informed as the Coun-
cil in order to be able to participate in an efficient way. 
A second e xplanation is that there is a conflict between politicians looking 
for legitimacy, and bureaucrats looking for efficiency. The argument b e-
hind the difference might then be that politicians are more influential in 
Parliament than they are in the Council. The Swedish position is that open-
ness/accountability is an efficiency-producing instrument e.g. in bringing 
down the level of corruption. It has been said that openness promotes the 
best bureaucrats and weeds out the worst. 
A third explanation is that in the Parliament, Members most interested in 
openness and accountability are from the Nordic Countries, the Nether-
lands and the UK. This has produced the effect that the rapporteurs were all Bo Bjurulf 
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from these countries. The debate in Parliament was completely dominated 
by MEPs from these countries. There was, however, through the whole 
process, a feeling that if the issue would be polarized, representatives from 
the secrecy inclined member states might also get involved in the process 
with a negative result from an openness perspective. 
A fourth explanation is that the British process toward a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act tipped the scale in Parliament. In Parliament the British MEP 
Michael Cashman and Graham Watson played decisive roles. It might also 
be noted that with  the British and the Irish the openness coalition reaches 
the important blocking position in the Council. 
A fifth explanation is that the process of change is a result of a gradual pro-
cess involving the Ombudsman and the Court on the basis of complaints 
from true agents of change like the Guardian, Statewatch and the Journalist. 
These agents of change influence public opinion and no Parliament is i n-
sensitive to public pressure. It might be noted that they were very critical 
when the solution was reached. Statewatch's Tony Bunyan was quoted in 
the Guardian: "The Parliament has rolled over and given in to the council. 
Its been a wholly undemocratic process" (The Guardian26/04/2001). How-
ever, why the Council should be less sensitive than the Parliament to public 
pressure is a good question. 
It is important to notice that the Swedish Presidency influenced the open-
ness process before being part of the negotiation process as President. The 
first instrument, which already had been used, was to use the shadow of the 
incoming Presidency. In my opinion several of the Commission's access 
proposals were influenced by the Swedish position and the incoming Swed-
ish Presidency (especially the proposals concerning easier access to incom-
ing documents, masking and registers.) The shadow of the Belgian Presi-
dency (in the second half of 2001) was according to MEP sources i mpor-
tant in the transparency process. 
It was also important in the process to influence by example. The order 
went out to all the Swedish chairpersons that this was going to be the most 
transparent Presidency ever. Denmark, 1993, UK 1992 and 1998 intro-
duced some transparency activities to the European Union. Finland 1999 Sweden and the European Union 
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was leading by example when it put documents and calendars on the Web 
for the first time ("lex K emppinen"). After some passivity by the Portu-
guese and French Presidencies the Swedish Presidency carried the Finnish 
example forward. 
Our second  puzzle was how two minorities in Parliament and in Council 
could change the Commission proposal in fundamental ways. 
First of all the Commission produced a proposal that didn't satisfy anyone. 
The necessity to protect sensitive documents was not anticipated, the list of 
exceptions was a step backwards even according to Council lawyers, the 
process towards a better administrative culture was not codified, civil soci-
ety was not consulted etc. Furthermore, if the Commission had produced a 
proposal less adapted to its own administrative structure and to Swedish 
demands and more adapted to a secrecy related majority view the Swedish 
negotiation position would have been much worse. The problem for the 
Commission, however, was that there was no active majority position. The 
majority was uninterested until the problem with sensitive NATO-
documents appeared. 
The second factor were the relations between the Parliament, Council, 
Presidency and Commission. The transparency activists in Parliament 
trusted the Swedish Presidency and distrusted the French and even more a 
Spanish one on the horizon. The Council trusted the Swedish chief negotia-
tor Gunnar Lund. His instrument against the most secrecy minded members 
of the Council was the Parliament and a commitment to protect the sensi-
tive documents.  
A third factor was the form of the process, which produced Commission 
passivity all  the way up to the last days of the negotiations. In the informal 
trialogues the Commission refused to be treated as a Member State e x-
pected to produce demands during the trialogue process. 
A fourth factor was Sweden's technical competence. Being from a country 
that had dealt, legally, with the issue since 1766, the Swedish experts had 
the upper hand against lawyers from the Council and from countries with 
little experience in Freedom Of Information Acts. Related to this was the 
negotiation ability of Gunnar Lund.  Bo Bjurulf 
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He stepped on a number of toes but his use of the parliament and not 
to allow certain proposals on the table was very clever (High ranking 
Commission representative 18/6, 2001).  
A fifth factor was the deadline, May 1, 2001, in the Amsterdam treaty, 
which was used heavily as an instrument in Sweden's/Gunnar Lund's push-
ing activities. 
The result was a regulation in which the Council achieved its special treat-
ment of sensitive documents. The Parliament and the Presidency achieved 
an improved obligation for the bureaucrats to help out as well as a higher 
level of parliamentary control. Moreover, a number of exceptions like 
"space to think" and "the confidentiality of the proceedings" were "softened 
up" in a transparency direction. These writings will be watched over by the 
Ombudsman and transparency friendly MEPs. The Court will be obliged to 
give its verdict on the scope of the definitions in a number of cases. The 
Court and Swedish officials will decide whether Sweden got the much-
wanted protection for its Constitution. The Commission (and the Council) 
will have trouble with the conflict between the new regulation and the s e-
crecy culture in parts of the organisations. The Commission will above all 
have a lot of work to do implementing the new regulation. The overview is 
given to Parliament with the interinstitutional committee, the yearly r e-
ports, the evaluation in 2004, the Ombudsman and the Court, which so far 
has decided in a way favoring more openness. 
In Europe the new regulation was roundly praised, except by very openness 
friendly MEP's and organisations with an increased transparency on the 
agenda, which criticized the secrecy of the trialogue process and the sensi-
tive documents solution fearing that it would spill over into new areas. In 
Sweden t his criticism was echoed and the problem with originator control 
was added since it threatened the Swedish constitutional principle that no 
one but the law could tell a Swedish official, which documents should be 
secret (for this section cf. Bjurulf, 2001). 
The employment  issue was definitely an issue with a history. The question 
was whether Sweden could follow up the employment process from Lux-
emburg 1997, with employment guidelines and national programs, via the 
Cardiff process to improve structural reforms of goods-, service- and capi-Sweden and the European Union 
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tal markets to the Cologne process, which implies a coordination of macro-
economic policies (cf. Jacobsson, 2001). 
In the employment area the Swedish Presidency had problems on several 
levels: 
(1) It was wedged in between the French and the Belgian Presidencies who 
rather wanted to focus on a European social agenda and social cohesion 
(Jacobsson, 2000, p. 6). The Belgian employment minister Onkelinx 
talked about a "European social model" to replace different national 
models and made specific proposals concerning joint pension, equality 
and labour market regulations. Here the Swedish government was not 
enthusiastic, especially due to the conflict between a continental family 
based welfare system and joint taxation and a Swedish i ndividually 
based system with day-care centres, individual taxation etc. 
(2) Another conflict is the Swedish position that full employment is the 
best instrument against social deprivation. Denmark will have to follow 
up the employment perspective if this  is lost during the Belgian and 
Spanish Presidencies. 
(3) There is also a conflict between the free market enthusiasts Great Brit-
ain and Spain on one hand and France and Germany on the other, which 
are of the opinion that liberalization is not a goal, it is a means. Fur-
thermore national interests (not the least French) have played a compli-
cating part. 
(4) The main problem for Sweden was the economic down turn, which 
seems to have dampened the Lisbon enthusiasm. 
Sweden chose, in this process, to be manager, m ediator and a builder of 
consensus with the problems stated above. The Presidency worked closely 
with the Commission and the Council Secretariat. Sweden was criticized, 
even by Prodi, President of the Commission, for being too geared toward 
compromises. Compared to the Portuguese, the French and the Belgian 
Presidencies the Swedish Presidencies seem to be short of visions and de-
mands. The explanation can be found in the conflicts above but also in the 
fact that demands would necessitate more federal solutions, which is not Bo Bjurulf 
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according to Swedish goals. Anyhow the Swedish Presidency seems to 
have been a good manager (for this section cf. Jacobsson, 2001). 
Environment, a true Nordic priority is an excellent issue for a positive 
Swedish internal opinion. In this area Sweden thinks it can lead Europe by 
example. The Swedes argue that they are at the forefront having concrete, 
clear and long-term policies for an ecologically sustainable development. 
The Swedish Prime Minister has also stressed the importance of the  envi-
ronment issue area in Swedish public opinion. The Swedish Presidency 
achieved a EU strategy for sustainable development at the meeting of the 
European Council in Gothenburg. The starting-point was that EU citizens 
shall be guaranteed economic stability, social security and a clean and 
healthy and secure environment, and that sustainable development called 
for global solutions (Results of the Swedish Presidency, 01/07/2001). 
In the environmental field the EU is going through a framing process. In 
the words of Annika Kronsell:  
environmental problems have been defined first as costly impediments 
to economic practices; later as a possible source of income and new 
markets; and finally as the basis of economic activities. It is in reflec-
tive problem framing that most changes toward greening have taken 
place. This has been done in declarations, programs and reports but 
perhaps less so in practical politics (Kronsell, 1997, p. 194). 
It is quite obvious that different countries within the EU are at different 
levels in this framing process. The Swedish Presidency was not in a posi-
tion to push through a great breakthrough in the environmental field. The 
fact that the proposal from the Commission came late was one major 
problem. The fact that harmonization of taxes i s against Swedish policies 
was a problem especially from a Green perspective as regards a much 
needed tax on the emission of carbon dioxides. 
On a positive note the EU's conflict with the USA on the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol might be positive for the environmental issue if the conflict 
results in a climate dialogue between EU and USA. The breakthrough in 
the closure of the environmental chapters with the candidate countries 
might be of the utmost importance for the greening of Europe. Sweden and the European Union 
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Thus, in conclusion, Sweden exerted some influence in areas where they 
could show "how it could be done from a different perspective". Employ-
ment and environment were such areas for the Swedish Presidency but the 
influence was mostly a strategy producer. The time was not right for a sub-
stantial breakthrough. In the enlargement field Sweden was mostly a 
pusher. In the transparency issue the time was right and if the Swedish 
Presidency made Europe take another step towards greater openness, ser-
vice mindedness and accountability, that might help a fledging EU-
legitimacy. The main problem for Swedish influence in general is the 
North-South cultural division. We (Elgström, Bjurulf, Johansson and San-
nerstedt, 2001) asked the Swedish members of the EU committees which 
country r epresentatives they usually cooperated with. Not surprisingly 
Denmark and Finland were at the top with 70%. Great Britain was not far 
behind with 63% followed by the Netherlands at 36% and Germany at 27% 
and the Mediterranean countries close to zero. This  is, however, the base 
for blocking coalitions but not for qualified majority positions. A Northern 
European agenda has clear problems reaching a qualified majority and 
these problems will magnify when the enlargement is completed. So far the 
North/South dimension is, according to our respondents, the only dominant 
type of coalition. 82% of the committee representatives said that the 
North/South division occurred much more often than the integration-
ists/sovereignty dimension with 32%. However, in its role as a consensus 
builder the Presidency can never build only on a Northern European 
agenda. In that job you need good people with good ideas. Not least since 
the consensus principle in the European Union should and many times do 
promote good ideas. 
Could a reluctant and neutral European nation like 
Sweden manage the CFSP despite its non-NATO mem-
bership. What about the EMU? 
The Swedes solved what might be regarded as a dilemma by focusing on 
traditional Swedish interests like intensified cooperation with the UN, d e-
velopment of EU's civil crisis management and conflict prevention and Bo Bjurulf 
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playing down NATO relations and the development of military capacity 
resources, deficiencies and priority clarifications as well as a better basis 
for new contributions of forces from Member States in the autumn of 2001. 
Sweden as a small state had intensive cooperation with the high representa-
tive Solana and the Commission representative Patten. Sweden relied on 
Solana and might even have bolstered his position. A larger state would 
probably have used its own foreign office to a higher degree instead. Rela-
tions between Solana and the Swedish Foreign Minister Lindh seem to 
have been excellent. Obviously, Sweden needed Solanas position as a for-
mer Secretary General of NATO. It is rumoured that Lindh gave Solana a 
new mobile so they could speed up the exchange of messages. 
However, Sweden showed in several issues, above all in the policy against 
Macedonia a capacity and a will to produce a united EU strategy. During 
the Swedish Presidency the EU was also very active in the Middle East. 
Sweden as a small state did well in the CFSP issue area. Sweden as a new 
member did surprisingly well relying on a good relationship with Solana, 
Patten, Blair and Schröder. The picture of Sweden as a reluctant European, 
especially in the CFSP area, must be revised. There is a glaring difference 
between the Swedish activities in Europe and the scepticism shown in front 
of Swedish audiences. Swedish neutrality and "the old type of Swedish ac-
tivism" are and will be debated. If it is possible to elevate Swedish ideas of 
conflict prevention and conflict management to a European level and thus 
put them on the international scene by an actor large enough to be a serious 
contender and complement to the USA that might  be a good argument 
against Sweden performing its traditional role as a conscience for the world 
as well as a good argument for working for a CFSP with better policies, 
organisation and equipment (for this section cf. Bengtsson/Strömvik, 
2001). 
What about the EMU? Not much of the EMU was mentioned in the Results 
of the Swedish Presidency. It might be argued that this is an area where all 
the decisions have been taken and implementation has been left to ECB in 
Frankfurt. Here and there especially in federalist parts of the EU-parliament 
there were some grumbles about Swedish non-membership. However, it is Sweden and the European Union 
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my opinion that if Sweden lacked influence this could more be attributed to 
other factors, like smallness, radical goals and cultural conflicts. 
What were the national and international reactions to 
the Swedish Presidency? 
A Presidency is evaluated at many levels. Government colleagues, across 
Europe are evaluating the Swedish Prime Ministers efforts during the six 
months. EU-institutions are buzzing with reactions. Media had their articles 
and their TV-talk shows. These images are important even if you do not 
agree with the statement that images are not the only thing, they are every-
thing. 
Of special interest for us is the reaction in Swedish and European newspa-
pers as well as the reaction in the Swedish and the EU-Parliament (EP). 
Those reactions are the most open ones. Reactions in the Council and 
Commission are also important but harder to get at. 
Newspaper reactions: 
When comparing Swedish and European newspaper reactions the trans-
parency (access) regulation and the management function would seem to 
have been great achievements according to European newspapers. The 
European newspapers were less impressed with the three E's and espe-
cially Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was not impressed by the enlarge-
ment negotiations. On the whole it is striking that in the Frankfurter All-
gemeine as well as in Le Monde and in Le Figaro, Sweden's position as 
Presidency was rarely mentioned and Sweden was not considered a factor 
in the negotiations except when it came to transparency. All in all the Fi-
nancial Times was slightly more positive (from Broman and Rosén, 2001). 
The reactions in the Swedish newspapers (Dagens Nyheter and Svenska 
Dagbladet) were almost the opposite with, first of all, a critical reaction 
to the transparency (access) regulation with a general press opinion that 
Sweden could have done more. Secondly, the Swedish impact on the e n-
largement negotiations was considered to be the largest success. Above 
all, in  the Swedish newspapers attention was drawn to the political posi-Bo Bjurulf 
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tion Sweden had as (external) representative of the union (Meetings with 
Bush and Putin, negotiations about Macedonia and the Middle East). In 
fact Swedish and European press only agreed on Sweden being a good 
manager. Safe but dull (From Broman and Rosén, 2001). 
Parliamentarian reactions: 
In the Swedish Parliament there was a distinct party truce in line with a 
Swedish foreign policy tradition. The two largest political parties in Par-
liament,  the Social Democrats and the Conservatives, usually find common 
ground in the foreign policy area. In a comparative perspective this biparti-
sanship is not unusual especially not during EU-Presidencies. The only 
clear exception was the conflict between the  President and the Prime Min-
ister during the French Presidency in the fall of 2000. The only conflict that 
can be found in the Swedish Parliament is the question of how the power 
should be distributed within the EU. That question is a "hot potato" for the 
Swedish Social Democrats and it is not surprising that this question was 
happily deferred to the Belgian Presidency. In fact the Swedish Social D e-
mocrats are in favour of extending EU-power to new areas provided that it 
is done through the intergovernmental coordination method. Swedish Con-
servatives and Liberals are sceptical to extending EU-power e.g. in the 
Employment area. They want a limited but strong EU. The Social Democ-
rats would seem to be in some trouble here since their electorate is not in 
favour of extending power to the EU (cf. Hegeland and Johansson, 2001). 
The reaction in the EP was politically biased. The Social Democrats liked 
what the Swedes did but the Conservatives were more critical. It came as 
no surprise that the Swedish PM's preference for the intergovernmental 
model and a strong Council was generally criticized. When the Swedish 
PM met the Parliament on January 17, 2001, the EPP leader Hans Gert Pöt-
tering stated that the Council should not be stronger, it should rather be 
more transparent and it should be reformed in order to open the Council 
doors to the public. 
Since Parliament is an EU-institution, which pushes enlargement, many 
MEP's have officially and inofficially been very pleased with Sweden's Sweden and the European Union 
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commitment. They regarded the statements in the Gothenburg documents 
as a great achievement (Malmstrom, 2001). 
As regards employment, many MEP's criticized Sweden's lack of convinc-
ing e.g. Germany and France in Stockholm to take more financial deregula-
tion steps (Malmstrom, 2001). 
As regards environment, Sweden has been praised for its ambitions. Par-
liament states in its final declaration:  
that it is pleased that the Swedish Presidency has considered sustain-
able development to be of such a significance. 
The transparency (access) regulation  was criticized for the lack of transpar-
ency in its trialogue form. "Openness but behind closed doors". As regards 
substance Parliament had a lot of trust in the Swedish Presidency. A major-
ity praised Sweden for the result even though the regulation was only r e-
garded as a step forward and that the continuing transparency process 
should be closely monitored by Parliament. 
As regards CFSP the consolidation of a European position and the devel-
opment of conflict prevention and civilian conflict management was noted 
by Parliament. It was considered that Foreign Minister Anna Lind had been 
impressive in her work with Chris Patten and Javier Solana in Macedonia 
and the Middle East (Malmstrom, 2001). 
Parliamentary criticism in the EU was mainly that the Swedish Presidency 
had no ideas on the future of the EU. The Swedish PM and the Foreign 
Minister both emphasized the importance of a discussion of this future but 
they had few ideas how this future should be shaped. Pat Cox said to the 
Swedish Foreign Minister when Nice was debated in Parliament that Swe-
den’s position was "extremely cautious". Concerning management, Par-
liament felt somewhat pushed aside during the first half of the Swedish 
Presidency. During the second half there was nothing but praise. The 
trialogue method was an efficient, albeit non-transparent, tool in the 
hands of the Swedish Presidency (Malmstrom, 2001). Bo Bjurulf 
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Conclusion 
Concluding, we will return to our questions and make our final remarks. 
(1) Does the presidency, as such, carry any weight? 
We can, I t hink, conclude that the presidency does carry weight, but 
only if it is lucky with the agenda. The presidency doesn't run the 
agenda, the agenda runs the presidency. Sweden was lucky that the 
transparency issue had progressed just far enough so that Sweden with a 
lot of effort could be influential. Sweden was, probably, also lucky with 
the enlargement. With a lot of effort and some good ideas I do think 
that it is difficult to argue that Sweden didn't have a lasting influence on 
the process. However, Sweden didn't carry much weight in the mploy-
ment and the environment issue area despite a lot of effort. The time 
was not right for all the reasons given above. Another example is Ger-
many, which had high ambitions for their presidency in the spring of 
1999 but w as unfortunate with the demise of the Commission and the 
war in Kosovo. These crises were i mportant for carrying the EU-
process forward but they didn't help the German ambitions. 
(2) Could a small member state, like Sweden, manage the EU as well as a 
large one? 
There are two main reasons why this is possible. The first is EU's pri-
mary commandment for its presidency: "Thou shall have no other pri-
orities but the best of the Union." For reasons given above it seems eas-
ier for a small nation to follow that commandment than it is for a larger 
one. It is easy to find examples where large nations have been carried 
away by their national (e.g. France, 2000) priorities. The other reason is 
the hypothesis that in an international system where the very idea of 
sovereignty itself is under challenge and large multilateral i nstitutions 
are gaining power, influence is no longer related to size but rather to a 
capacity for innovative thinking and a capacity for building networks 
and alliances (Joenniemi, 1998, p. 62 and Arter, 2000, p. 678 and 691). 
(3) Did Sweden in the role of the Presidency influence the policies of the 
European Union? Sweden and the European Union 
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We have concluded that Sweden exerted influence as a strategic pro-
ducer in the employment and environment issue areas. In the enlarge-
ment field Sweden was mostly a pusher. In the transparency (access) i s-
sue Sweden has helped Europe take another step toward greater open-
ness, service-mindedness and accountability that might help a fledging 
EU-legitimacy. Of greater importance from a Swedish perspective is 
whether Sweden passed the initiation rite that the Presidency is for a 
new member. In my opinion the real initiation was the Swedish efforts 
within the CFSP and fighting the USA over the Kyoto treaty. After the 
CFSP efforts I would be very much surprised if Sweden were not r e-
garded as a "real member", even if I have met several high ranking 
members in Brussels wondering how neutral Sweden could act the way 
they do/did in the CFSP issue area. 
(4) Could a reluctant and neutral nation like Sweden m anage the CFSP de-
spite its non-NATO membership? What about the EMU? 
Surprisingly enough Swedish management of the CFSP seems to have 
been a success due to good chemistry between Lindh, Patten and Solana 
and a hugh Swedish management effort within the security issue area. 
This I think toned down Sweden’s reputation as a "reluctant" European. 
However, with the EMU question still unresolved, it is still there. 
(5) What were the national and international reactions? 
If the first commandment for a EU presidency  is "don't forget that you 
work for the Union", the second commandment is "don't forget that you 
are not elected by the Union". This was Finland's mistake according to 
Finnish representatives in Brussels. Finnish representatives worked so 
much in the interests of the Union that they forgot about Finnish media 
and the general Finnish public. A positive Finnish opinion turned chilly. 
However, when extremely positive reviews turned up in international 
media Finnish media thawed. (DN, 1/7, 2000). The Swedish media did-
n't react in quite the same way. The (few) positive reactions in the 
European media and the more frequent positive reactions in the Euro-
pean Parliament didn't convince the Swedish media. The Swedish Prime 
Minister Göran Persson, The Foreign Minister  Anna Lindh, the Minis-Bo Bjurulf 
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ter of Trade Leif Pagrotsky and the permanent representative Gunnar 
Lund have all been treated in a positive way in several leading Euro-
pean Newspapers (Broman and Rosén, 2001). In Swedish media the 
less flattering aspects and isolated mistakes have got a lot of coverage. 
Surprisingly enough the Swedes have become more positive to the 
EMU after the Swedish Presidency. In September 2001 an opinion poll 
by Demoskop polled 44% yes and 44% no to the EMU (in May, 2001 
there was a 9% difference against). The PM explains the change more 
by economic factors including the fledging Swedish crown rather than 
the Swedish Presidency (DN, 9/9, 2001). 
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